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DE PAUL

LAW REVIEW

TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY-APPLICATION TO AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND DEALERS
Chester Vandermark, the plaintiff, purchased a new automobile from
an authorized Ford dealer. Following the general practice of the trade,
the dealer made final adjustments ,on the car before making delivery.
After six weeks of use, in which time Vandermark drove 1,500 miles, he
lost control of his car due to defective brakes, and the resulting accident
caused serious injuries to his sister and himself. Vandermark brought an
action for breach of warranty and negligence against the Ford Motor Co.
and the dealer. The trial court granted Ford's motion for a nonsuit on
both causes of action and directed a verdict in favor of the dealer as to the
warranty action on the ground that a clause in the contract of sale disclaimed liability for personal injuries. As to the negligence action, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the negligence action but reversed it as to the warranty action, holding both defendants liable on
the grounds of strict liability in tort for the damages caused by the defective automobile. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
391 P.2d 168 (1964).
Prior to the appeal, but following the trial court's decision, the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,' imposing strict tort liability for defects on manufacturers. Vandermark urged that this theory controlled his case. The
Greenman case held that ". . . the manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury
'2
to a human being."
The importance' of the Vandermark case is two-fold: it is the first case
to follow the precedent set down by Greenman relative to manufacturers,
and it extends the strict liability theory to retailers. Pertaining to this extension, the opinion in the Vandermark case reads as follows:
[Retailers] are an integral part of the -overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products....
In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff .... Since [the dealer] is strictly liable
in'
tort, the fact that it restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is
immaterial. Regardless of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject
to strict liability in. tort because it is in the business of selling automobiles,
one of which proved to be defective and caused injury to human beings.a
159 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).

2 1d. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900.

3 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899, 391 P.2d 168, 171 (1964).
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The authority for this extension of strict liability to the retailer is
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 4 in which the court held the
dealer and the manufacturer liable under an implied warranty theory
even though the driver of the automobile was not in privity with the
dealer or the manufacturer, and the purchaser had signed the standard
auto purchase contract which disclaimed liability for injuries caused by
defects. The court held that the disclaimeir of liability clause was void
as it was contrary to sound public policy, i and that the burden on the
retailer by applying strict liability was cne of the hazards of doing
business.
The theory of holding manufacturers and dealers strictly liable in tort
avoids the difficulties which arise in an action for breach of warranty,
for as Gillam points out, "a contract theory necessarily puts the source
of the obligation, not in the larw, but in the deal . . .," and this results
in attempts to avoid liability through a disclaimer clause. The Vandermark
case avoids the disclaimer problem by stating that disclaimers relate only
to limitation of contractual liability and nct to tort. Strict tort liability
also avoids other problems raised by the warranty theory, including defenses of lack of privity, lack of notice, and no sale. The issue in an action
based on strict liability is whether the product was defective, and whether
the defect was the proximate cause of the injury.
The public policy argument for strict liability in tort is based on the
7
premise of spreading the burden of harm caused by defective products.

4 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).

5 Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95: "we are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity." See
also id. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97: "we conclude that the disclaimer of an implied warranty
of merchantability by the dealer, [is] violative of public policy and void." But see
Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 137 S.E.2d 225 (W.Va. :964), wherein the court held that
a purchaser was in privity with the manufacturer for purposes of the disclaimer and
barred liability. After this decision, West Virginia adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code, and it would be interesting to conjecture a; to the court's decision in light
of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, dealing with unconscionable contracts or
clauses of contracts. The Williams case did not consider the issues raised by the Henningsen case.
6 GILLAM, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 62 (1960).
7 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion of Justice Traynor): "[e]ven if there is no negligence, however,
public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards of life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market"; Jacob E. Decker and Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828,
829 (1942): "/l/iability in such case is not based on negligence nor on a breach of
the usual implied contractual warranty, but on th. broad principle of the public
policy to protect human health and life"; Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 104
(D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962): "in situations where public policy
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Such policy has two advantages, one an equitable argument, the other
stemming from economic theory. It is unfair to make randomly-selected
individuals bear the costs of the injuries caused by manufactured products.8 Strict liability will spread the risks to society through the price
of the product. In economic theory, the market system will arrive at
the optimum allocation of resources in terms of consumer and factorowner preferences only when the marginal social benefits of an activity
are equal to the marginal social costs and all benefits accure to the user
and all costs to the producer.9 The harm arising from product defects
is one of the costs of a particular activity. Strict liability in tort allocates
these costs to the producing and distributing industries, thus making
these industries bear the costs, rather than individual members of the
public. This permits the market system to operate more efficiently in its
task of allocating resources and maximizing total satisfaction. 10
Lang" argues for strict liability and compulsory insurance as a solution
to injury-causing activities, and further suggests that "damages payable
should ... as far as possible ... be ascertainable by reference to a schedule
as to a particular category of goods was strong enough, such public policy justified
a departure from the strict wording of the statute. [If the lack of privity can be used]
for food cases, because of public policy, by what reasoning can it be held that the
barrier excludes allowance of the same remedy to other non-'buyers' as to whom the
public policy of protection appears to be equally justified." See also Putman v. Erie
City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), wherein an excellent biography of cases
on the development of product liability law appears in footnote 19, page 919-20.
SFor the drawbacks in relying on negligence and implied warranty theories to spread
the burden, see Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); and
Keeton, Products Liability-Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 TEXAS L. REv. 855 (1963).
9 See DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 7-9 (1963). For an excellent discussion of the
problems raised by social costs for the market system, see KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS
OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 1-47 (1950).

10This is analogous to the theory behind Workmen's Compensation, wherein
businesses are forced through an insurance premium to pay for the injuries to workers
arising out of their activities. See Malone, Damage Suits and the ContagiousPrinciple
of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA. L. REv. 231 (1952). But see Plant, Strict Liability
of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957), wherein Mr. Plant argues that some marginal manufacturers
would have to go out of business if they were held under strict liability: "In the case
of an industry a substantial general addition to price may have a devastating effect upon
marginal producers." (Plant, supra at 947) This objection is not valid, for if a firm
can only stay in business by passing its costs on to the public in the form of random
personal injuries, it should not stay in business, since the marginal social cost is
exceeding the marginal social benefit. Professor Plant makes a number of other
criticisms of strict liability, the most telling of which is the possible inhibitory effects
of the doctrine on the willingness of businesses to bring out new products.
11 Lang, The Actvity-Risk Theory of Tort: Risk, Insurance, and Insolvency, 39
CAN. B. REv. 530 (1961).
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which would include complicated medical detail."'12 When the liability
arises out of social and economic policy considerations rather than fault,
the innocent victim or the innocent manufacturer or dealer should not
be left to the vagaries of the jury-the one as to his recovery, the other
as to his cost. This view is based on the reasoning that since broad social
policy is to affix the liability, broad social policy should also affix the
recovery. It seems that the logic of this theory might lead to a legislative
13
determination of damages as is done in workmen's compensation.
The Greenman and Vandermark theory has been adopted by the Re14
statement of Torts (Second), sec. 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
While the Restatement extends strict liability by including property damage, a recent California case, Seely v. White Motor Co.,15 refused to extend the doctrine of Greenman and Va!dermark to property damage
because such was not the law in Californi.. The court made no mention
of the Restatement draft in its decision, but held that such was Within
the logical limits of strict liability. The case is now before the Supreme
Court where they will adopt or repudiate this theory relative to property
damage. It would appear that the logic of spreading the risk of loss-as
first set down by Justice Trayner in his concurring opinion in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Ca.16 and restated by him in both the Greenman

case and the Vandermark case-will lead inexorably to the full acceptance
of the Restatement draft.
Although the judicial phraseology behind Greenman and Vandermark
cases and the Restatement is supported by .ound theory and many other
authorities,' 7 it has not yet been adopted in any state but California.
Other states cling to a theory of implied warranty and attempt to achieve
the effect of strict liability by relaxing or removing the requirement of
privity. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,'8 the New York
12 1d. at 540.

13 See Atkins, The Impact of the Growth of Enterprise Liability on the Theory
of Damages in Accident Cases, 20 LA. L. REv. 50 (1959).
14 RESTATEAMENT (SECOND), TORTS S 402a (Tent. )raft No. 10, 1964): "(1) One who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property. .. . (2) The rule stated in subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller."
15 228 Cal. App. 2d 851, 39 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1964).
16 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
17 See Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., supra note 7, at 920 for a bibliography of the
leading articles expounding the strict liability theory.
18 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
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court came close to adopting the terminology of the California decisions
when they said that strict tort liability was "surely a more accurate
phrase""' but in phrasing the issue they asked whether an implied warranty runs to users of a product despite lack of privity. In Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 20 the Illinois court cited Greenman with approval and then

followed the reasoning of New York in the Goldberg case. In Wood v.
Hub Motor Co.,21 and Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corporation,22 the
Greenman case was cited, but implied warranty theories were followed.
These examples show that courts which are faced with product liability
questions are unable or unwilling to overcome the weight of tradition
by accepting the strict liability concept. 23 Clearly, some action by the

courts is necessary to eliminate the jumble of terminology which has
arisen from the attempt to bring about strict liability out of the contract24
based law of warranty.
Philip Rummel
1o ld. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83.
20 51111. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964).
21

110 Ga. App. 101, 137 S.E.2d 674 (1964).

22 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
23

79 Nev.241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963).

24 For some interesting procedural questions posed by the Vandermark case, see 48
MARQ. L. REv. 268, 272-3 (1964).

